Abstract: This paper provides a theoretical analysis of product and process patent regimes in
Introduction
Under the current WTO (World Trade Organisation) regime, one of the most debated issues in international negotiation is the issue of standardizing (and strengthening) the patent systems across the world. The debate gathered momentum due to the Dunkel proposal related to Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
The issue of similar patent standards across the countries led to a sharp division between the advanced developed countries (North) and the developing countries (South). In the Southern countries (e.g., India), the governments usually practice process patent regime and that too with varying degrees of enforcements under their laws. 1 The North, on the other hand, always insisted on the product patent regime in the South as practiced in the North. The issue created lots of discussions since many Southern countries has to comply with the product patent in near future under the current WTO regime. In this context we provide an analysis on the issue of product versus process patent in the South and its welfare implications. More specifically, in an intra-industry trade framework, we ask whether there is any merit of continuing with the process patent regime in the South.
The question of whether the North prefers product or process patent in the South is very important. The conventional economic reason underlying the conflict of interest between Northern and Southern countries is easy to see. Northern countries are the major producers of newer technologies. Southern countries are almost totally dependent on the North for technologies needed for their growth and development. In case of process patent in the South, it is often be the case that the Southern firm develops a different process of production that uses some of the cheap resources available in the South. As a result the Northern firm faces competition from the Southern firm in the Southern market and thereby it is deprived of some of the monopoly benefits it could derive from selling the product in the South. On the other hand, if South practices product patent, Northern firm is protected from any competition in the same product in the Southern market. Thus, product patent in the South would allow Northern firm to get the monopoly benefit in the 1 This is in the context of the empirical findings on patent protection in developing countries. In International Finance Corporation's survey (Mansfield, 1994) of 16 countries it was reported that the countries perceived to have the weakest patent protections are India, Thailand, Brazil and Nigeria.
1 South. Hence, the Northern firm would prefer the product patent in the South and it is believed that the incentive of a firm to introduce new products would be higher.
The above view neglects some of the interesting dimensions of product versus process patent in the context of intra-industry trade. Consider a world characterized by product patent in the North and process patent in the South. Suppose, the Southern firm can innovate new products as well as do process innovation of the existing product of the Northern firm. In this situation, the Northern firm can also undertake process innovation of the Southern firm's new product and sell the product in the South (due to process patent there). However, due to product patent in the North, Southern firm can enter the Northern market only with a different product. Once we consider innovation by the Southern firm and imitation by the Northern firm, some of the conventional wisdom might go wrong.
It is worth noting that innovation by the Southern firm is not just a theoretical possibility but is very much relevant in today's world. Many Asian countries such as South Korea, India and Taiwan are inventing new products those are competing with the existing products of the developed countries' firms. For example, many developing and newly industrialized countries such as India, Singapore, Taiwan and a number of Latin American countries are showing significant participation in software and also in hardware industries (Correa, 1990) . Recent paper by Tsai and Wang (2004) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature relevant to this paper. Section 3 presents the basic model. Section 4
shows the market structure that evolves under the product and the process patent regimes practiced in the South. Section 5 focuses on welfare implications of different patent regimes. Section 6 concludes.
Literature review
The literature on patent protection in the North-South trading environment has mainly focused on the issue of strengthening the patent protection by the Southern government in terms of making the imitation of the Northern technology more difficult.
The theoretical literature does not support the idea of universal patent protection for higher innovation rate and welfare. 2 In dynamic contexts, the issue of patent protection and its impact on innovation rate and welfare are discussed by many authors such as Grossman and Helpman (1991), Helpman (1993) , Segerstrom et al. (1990) and Lai (1998) . 3 Their findings seem to contradict the intuition furnished by Schumpeter (1942) and subsequently by Romer (1991) that stronger patent protection should encourage innovation. Chin and Grossman (1990) Deardorff (1992) also argued for limiting patent protection geographically rather than extending it universally across the world.
Glass and Saggi (2002) provide another resource-based argument against stronger patent protection. In a product cycle model with endogenous innovation, imitation and foreign direct investment, they argue that stronger intellectual property rights lead to more resources used for imitation, which in turn reduces FDI and consequently contracts innovation. In the context of strategic interactions between firms, Taylor (1994) discussed that failure of a country to provide patent protection to the foreign innovations forces the innovators to employ 'less than best practice technology' and reduces aggregate R&D and worldwide growth. In the first three papers, imitation is the only channel of international production transfer from North to South. Lai (1998) introduced the issue of foreign direct investment (FDI) with the modifications that Southern firms can imitate only after Northern firms transfer production to South. He concludes that stronger patent protection in the South increases the rate of product innovation if FDI is the channel of production transfer and has an opposite effect if production is transferred through imitation. 4 In the context of technology transfer where the different modes of technology transfer like licensing and wholly owned subsidiary are considered (Vishwasrao, 1994 , Markusen, 2001 , Fosfuri, 2000 and Sinha, 2001 , the general conclusion is that strengthening of patent protection does not necessarily lead to an increase in innovation rate or welfare.
4
The above papers have addressed the question of stronger intellectual property right under the process patent regime in South. Recently, Marjit and Beladi (1998) address the question of process versus product patent in the South. They show that if there are significant dispersions in international income distribution, product patent may prevent Northern firm to serve Southern market, which may provide a rationale for continuing process patent in South. However, unlike the present paper, which allows innovation by Southern firm and also knowledge diffusion from South to North, all the above-mentioned papers consider technology diffusion from North to South only.
The basic model
Consider two countries, called North and South, with separated markets. Assume that there is one firm in each of North and South and call these firms as firm N and Firm S respectively. For simplicity, we assume that at the beginning of the game neither firm has any technology to produce a good. These firms can invest in R&D to invent technology for a new product. However, they can also imitate the technology invented by the other firm, if the patent law permits.
While, in our analysis, we will always assume the imposition of product patent regime in the North, we will consider the impact of product and process patent regimes in South. Since, North always imposes product patent, it implies that only the original innovator can sell its product in the North market but no one else can sell its product in the North by imitating this technology. Similar situation also holds in the South when South imposes the product patent regime. But, in case the South imposes the process patent regime, both firms are allowed to do non-infringing imitation of the competitor's technology and sell the same product in the South.
We consider the following three stage game. In stage 1, the firms take decision on R&D to invent technology for a new product. We assume that firm N is trying to invent the technology of a product x, while firm S is trying to invent the technology of a product y. We consider that the products x and y are imperfect substitutes. 5, 6 We assume that each firm can invent a single technology at one point of time, which implies a restriction on the R&D capacity. 7 Since, we consider the products x and y as imperfect substitutes, it is easy to understand each firm will prefer to invent a technology different from its competitor. 8 In stage 2, the firms take decision about imitating the technology of the other firm. In stage 3, the firms compete in the product market like Cournot duopolists. We solve the game through backward induction.
Assume that the Northern firm is more capable in doing innovative R&D and therefore, it requires lower investment to invent the new technology. We assume that the R&D investment of the Northern firm is and the Southern firm needs to spend amount more than the Northern firm, where . So, the cost of the Southern firm for
. Further, to economize on the notation, we normalize the cost of innovative R&D of firm N to 0 .
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We assume that both firms are symmetric with respect to imitation. For simplicity, we further assume that imitation is costless. This assumption of costless imitation is consistent with the assumption of knowledge spillover in the previous works mentioned in the introduction.
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We consider the following demand structure in each country for our analysis. We assume that the representative consumer's utility is a function of consumption x , and the numeraire good , and is given by U
, where γ shows the degree of product differentiation. Given the utility function, the inverse market demand functions for x and in each of North and South are respectively
and
where and are the prices of x and y and is positive. Further, for simplicity, we assume that constant average cost of production for 
Implication on profits

Product Patent Regime
Let us first consider the situation under the product patent regime in South. Since, under product patent in South, neither firm can sell its product using the imitated technology, imitative R&D is not an option to these firms. In this situation, if firm S invents the new product by incurring the cost of R&D , these firms compete like Cournot duopolists in both North and South markets. So, in this situation, the outputs of x and y in each country 
Process patent Regime
Now consider the situation under process patent in South. After the decision on innovative R&D in stage 1, the firms decide on the imitative R&D in stage 2. Since, the cost of imitation is negligible, it is easy to check that, in stage 2, each firm finds it profitable to imitate the technology of the other firm, given that the other firm has invented the technology in stage 1.
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Let us now examine the decision of stage 1. Note that firm N always innovates x.
However, it is not immediate whether the firm S also finds it optimal to innovate y. 
However, firm S does OI instead of IR provided
Hence, if , profits of the firms under the process patent regime are given by (4).
On the other hand, if , profits of the firms under the process patent regime are given by (5).
Comparing the profits under product and process patent regimes
Let us consider the situation G F S < . Here firm S does IR under process patent in South.
It follows from (3) and (4) that, in this situation, both firms always prefer product patent in South since here 1 ( 9
Next, consider the situation where . In this situation, firm S does OI and the profits of the firms are given by (3) and (5).
G F S >
Profit of firm N is higher (lower) under product patent compared to process patent in the South provided 
Left hand side (LHS) of (7) is positive at 0 = γ . But LHS of (7) is negative at 1 = γ .
Since, LHS of (7) is continuous and decreasing in γ , firm N is better off under product patent compared to process patent provided γ is less than a critical value, say . But, 
It is easy to check that LHS of (8) is greater than and less than G (3)). Defining the LHS of (8) by H , we get that firm S prefers product (process) patent in South for )
The following proposition summarizes the above discussions. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the above proposition.
Proposition 1: (i) If the costs of innovation
) 0 , ( = ∈ PDP S S H F π c γ γ ) (< >
Figure 1
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. First, note that the underlying market structure for different costs of innovation is the crucial factor behind the above 13 We assume that firm S does product innovation provided it earns net positive profit. So, the values of are such that . 
Welfare implications
So far, we have examined the preferences of the firms. Now, we will examine the implications of different patent regimes on welfare of North and South.
Note that the welfare calculations can be made independently for each country depending on the amount of goods supplied and the profits of the firm located in the country. 14 We define welfare as the summation of consumer surplus and producer surplus of that country's firm. Producer Surplus of a country's firm consists of the profit from own country and the profit from the other country. Thus, welfare becomes "the consumers' utility plus the profit earned by own country's firm from abroad minus ' c multiplied by the total quantity of domestic consumption' minus profit earned by other country's firm".
Product patent regime in South
Let us first consider the situation under product patent in the South. In this situation, firm S invents the new product by incurring R&D cost and the firms compete like Cournot 
Process patent regime in South
In case of process patent in the South, firm S innovates y and also imitates x when . So, the Northern market would be supplied with x by firm N and y by firm S but both firms will supply both the goods in South.
G F S <
So, welfare in North is equal to ' + firm N's profit earned in the South --firm S's profit earned in the North'. Welfare in South is equal to ' u + firm S's profit earned in the North - 
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Comparing welfare under the product and the process patent regimes
Let us first consider the situation where G F S < . After rearranging, we find that, in this situation, welfare of North is higher under process patent compared to product patent in 
Right hand side (RHS) of (12) 
It is easy to check that condition (13) holds for any γ less than 1. Hence, if
welfare of South is always higher under process patent compared to product patent.
Next, consider the case of . Here, welfare of North is higher under process patent compared to product patent provided
Condition (14) holds at 1 = γ but does not hold at 0 = γ . Since RHS of (14) 
It is easy to check that RHS of (15) 
Figure 2 summarizes the above proposition.
Figure 2
Proposition 2(i) favors the North's argument for product patent in South, whereas
South prefers process patent in South. But Proposition 2(ii) shows that both Northern and Southern governments might prefer process patent in South. Therefore, the governments' preferences for process patent are perfectly in sync. Thus, the 'blanket' imposition of product patent system under the WTO regime reduces welfare in both countries.
15 One can easily check that is greater than D H , which is defined in the previous section.
Both firms always do product innovation for very low R&D cost (i.e.,
G F S < ),
irrespective of the type of patent protection in South. So, under the process patent regime in South, both firms also imitate each other's product and sell them in South. Thus, the Southern market becomes very competitive and creates sufficiently large consumer surplus, which leads to higher welfare in South under the process patent regime compared to the product patent regime. But, for these R&D costs, North prefers the product patent regime in the South precisely because the profit earned by the Northern firm in South under process patent is low due to higher competition in South. If the R&D costs are
), firm S would not undertake product innovation under the process patent regime in South, but would innovate the new product under the product patent regime in South. Hence, South gains by implementing the product patent regime since it encourages firm S to do product innovation and to enter the Northern market.
But, firm S's net profit under product innovation becomes low when the R&D cost is above D, which, in turn, makes the Southern country better off under the process patent regime than the product patent regime.
Northern welfare depends on the degree of product differentiation for . If the products are very close substitutes, it creates tough competition between the firms under the product patent regime in South. In this situation, the reduction in profit of firm N in the Northern and Southern markets is higher than the gain in consumer surplus in North, which makes the Northern country better off under the process patent regime in South compared to the product patent regime in South.
G F S >
16 But, if the goods are sufficiently differentiated, the product patent regime in the South does not reduce the profit of firm N significantly in the Northern and Southern markets but it increases consumer surplus in the North significantly. Therefore, in this situation, North is better off under the product patent regime in South than the process patent regime in South.
Let us now discuss the significance of our analysis. For small R&D costs (i.e., ) we find that the Northern firm, the Northern government and the Southern firm G F S < prefer the product patent regime in South, whereas the Southern government prefers the 
, both the Southern and Northern governments prefer the process patent regime in South and firms from the respective countries also prefer the process patent regime in South (this happens when γ> * γ ) and as a result, all parties are better off under the process patent regime in South. Thus, our analysis questions the basic tenet of the standardizing the patent system across the world and also reflects that it is not clear whose interest is served through the blanket imposition of the product patent regime in South.
Conclusion
In the context of patent protection one important question is whether the Northern country always prefers the product patent regime as opposed to a process patent regime in South. Without any explicit theoretical analysis on the issue, the current discussion on intellectual property rights has implicitly taken it for granted that implementing the product patent regime in the South would be the best for the North. This paper provides a theoretical analysis of product and process patents in the context of North-South trade.
More specifically, we ask whether Northern firm as well as the Northern country would necessarily benefit from introducing product patent as opposed to the process patent in
South. This question has been asked in an imperfectly competitive product market with differentiated products.
The theoretical analysis reveals some striking facts, which was hitherto not recognized in the literature. For example, it is not true that introducing product patent in the South would always maximize the Northern firm's profit or Northern country's welfare. In fact we find some parametric configurations for which both Northern firm and
Northern government would favor a system of process patent in South. This finding questions the basis of the 'blanket' approach of WTO towards a standardized patent system in favor of product patent in South. We find that there might be conflict of interest between the Northern government and Northern firm, and also Southern government and Southern firm. For some parametric configurations, we show that Northern government would favor the product patent regime in the South, although Northern firm would prefer the process patent regime in the South. This points towards the fact that introduction of product patent in South might serve the purpose of the Northern country but it hurts the Northern firm. It is also possible that the Southern firm may be better off under the product patent regime in South whereas the Southern government prefers the opposite.
Most interestingly, we find situations when both governments and both firms are better off under the process patent regime in South. We also find some parametric configurations where the Southern firm and the Southern government may prefer the product patent regime in South but the Northern firm and the Northern government prefer the process patent regime in South Thus, the analysis brings into light some of the interesting issues related to process and product patent regimes in the South and provides new insights into this discussion.
